Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth centuryĦBand regarded by some as the most important since Immanuel Kant. His early work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer andĦBespeciallyĦBby his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob FregeĦBwho became something of a friend. This work culminated in the Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusĦBthe only philosophy book that Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. It claimed to solve all the major problems of philosophy and was held in especially high esteem by the anti-metaphysical logical positivists. The Tractatus is based on the idea that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of the logic of languageĦBand it tries to show what this logic is. Wittgenstein's later workĦBprincipally his Philosophical InvestigationsĦBshares this concern with logic and languageĦBbut takes a differentĦBless technicalĦBapproach to philosophical problems. This book helped to inspire so-called ordinary language philosophy. This style of doing philosophy has fallen somewhat out of favorĦBbut Wittgenstein's work on rule-following and private language is still considered importantĦBand his later philosophy is influential in a growing number of fields outside philosophy.
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Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article)
1. Life
2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
3. Ethics and Religion
4. Conception of Philosophy
5. Meaning
6. Rules and Private Language
7. Realism and Anti-Realism
8. Certainty
9. Continuity
10. Wittgenstein in History
11. Annotated Bibliography
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1. Life
Ludwig Josef Johann WittgensteinĦBborn on April 26th 1889 in ViennaĦBAustriaĦBwas a charismatic enigma. He has been something of a cult figure but shunned publicity and even built an isolated hut in Norway to live in complete seclusion. His sexuality was ambiguous but he was probably gay; how actively so is still a matter of controversy. His life seems to have been dominated by an obsession with moral and philosophical perfectionĦBsummed up in the subtitle of Ray Monk's excellent biography Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius.
His concern with moral perfection led Wittgenstein at one point to insist on confessing to several people various sinsĦBincluding that of allowing others to underestimate the extent of his 'Jewishness'. His father Karl Wittgenstein's parents were born Jewish but converted to Protestantism and his mother Leopoldine (nee Kalmus) was CatholicĦBbut her father was of Jewish descent. Wittgenstein himself was baptized in a Catholic church and was given a Catholic burialĦBalthough between baptism and burial he was neither a practicing nor a believing Catholic.
The Wittgenstein family was large and wealthy. Karl Wittgenstein was one of the most successful businessmen in the Austro-Hungarian EmpireĦBleading the iron and steel industry there. The Wittgensteins' home attracted people of cultureĦBespecially musiciansĦBincluding the composer Johannes BrahmsĦBwho was a friend of the family. Music remained important to Wittgenstein throughout his life. So did darker matters. Ludwig was the youngest of eight childrenĦBand of his four brothersĦBthree committed suicide.
As for his careerĦBWittgenstein studied mechanical engineering in Berlin and in 1908 went to ManchesterĦBEngland to do research in aeronauticsĦBexperimenting with kites. His interest in engineering led to an interest in mathematics which in turn got him thinking about philosophical questions about the foundations of mathematics. He visited the mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925)ĦBwho recommended that he study with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in Cambridge. At Cambridge Wittgenstein greatly impressed Russell and G.E. Moore (1873- 1958)ĦBand began work on logic.
When his father died in 1913 Wittgenstein inherited a fortuneĦBwhich he quickly gave away. When war broke out the next yearĦBhe volunteered for the Austrian army. He continued his philosophical work and won several medals for bravery during the war. The result of his thinking on logic was the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus which was eventually published in English in 1922 with Russell's help. This was the only book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Having thusĦBin his opinionĦBsolved all the problems of philosophyĦBWittgenstein became an elementary school teacher in rural AustriaĦBwhere his approach was strict and unpopularĦBbut apparently effective. He spent 1926-28 meticulously designing and building an austere house in Vienna for his sister Gretl.
In 1929 he returned to Cambridge to teach at Trinity CollegeĦBrecognizing that in fact he had more work to do in philosophy. He became professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1939. During World War II he worked as a hospital porter in London and as a research technician in Newcastle. After the war he returned to university teaching but resigned his professorship in 1947 to concentrate on writing. Much of this he did in IrelandĦBpreferring isolated rural places for his work. By 1949 he had written all the material that was published after his death as Philosophical InvestigationsĦBarguably his most important work. He spent the last two years of his life in ViennaĦBOxford and Cambridge and kept working until he died of prostate cancer in Cambridge in April 1951. His work from these last years has been published as On Certainty. His last words wereĦB"Tell them I've had a wonderful life."
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2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Wittgenstein told Ludwig von Ficker that the point of the Tractatus was ethical. In the preface to the book he says that its value consists in two things: "that thoughts are expressed in it" and "that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." The problems he refers to are the problems of philosophy definedĦBwe may supposeĦBby the work of Frege and RussellĦBand perhaps also Schopenhauer. At the end of the book Wittgenstein says "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical" [emphasis added]. What to make of the TractatusĦBits authorĦBand the propositions it containsĦBthenĦBis no easy matter.
The book certainly does not seem to be about ethics. It consists of numbered propositions in seven sets. Proposition 1.2 belongs to the first set and is a comment on proposition 1. Proposition 1.21 is about proposition 1.2ĦBand so on. The seventh set contains only one propositionĦBthe famous "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."
Some important and representative propositions from the book are these:
1 The world is all that is the case.
4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
4.0312 ...My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
4.121 ...Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.
4.1212 What can be shownĦBcannot be said.
4.5 ...The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand.
5.43 ...all the propositions of logic say the same thingĦBto wit nothing.
5.4711 To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all descriptionĦBand thus the essence of the world.
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
Here and elsewhere in the Tractatus Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the essence of the world and of life is: This is how things are. One is tempted to add "--deal with it." That seems to fit what Cora Diamond has called his "accept and endure" ethicsĦBbut he says that the propositions of the Tractatus are meaninglessĦBnot profound insightsĦBethical or otherwise. What are we to make of this?
Many commentators ignore or dismiss what Wittgenstein said about his work and its aimsĦBand instead look for regular philosophical theories in his work. The most famous of these in the Tractatus is the "picture theory" of meaning. According to this theory propositions are meaningful insofar as they picture states of affairs or matters of empirical fact. Anything normativeĦBsupernatural or (one might say) metaphysical mustĦBit therefore seemsĦBbe nonsense. This has been an influential reading of parts of the Tractatus. UnfortunatelyĦBthis reading leads to serious problems since by its own lights the Tractatus' use of words like "object," "reality" and "world" is illegitimate. These concepts are purely formal or a priori. A statement such as "There are objects in the world" does not picture a state of affairs. Rather it isĦBas it wereĦBpresupposed by the notion of a state of affairs. The "picture theory" therefore denies sense to just the kind of statements of which the Tractatus is composedĦBto the framework supporting the picture theory itself. In this way the Tractatus pulls the rug out from under its own feet.
If the propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical then they surely cannot put forward the picture theory of meaningĦBor any other theory. Nonsense is nonsense. HoweverĦBthis is not to say that the Tractatus itself is without value. Wittgenstein's aim seems to have been to show up as nonsense the things that philosophers (himself included) are tempted to say. Philosophical theoriesĦBhe suggestsĦBare attempts to answer questions that are not really questions at all (they are nonsense)ĦBor to solve problems that are not really problems. He says in proposition 4.003 that:
Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.
PhilosophersĦBthenĦBhave the task of presenting the logic of our language clearly. This will not solve important problems but it will show that some things that we take to be important problems are really not problems at all. The gain is not wisdom but an absence of confusion. This is not a rejection of philosophy or logic. Wittgenstein took philosophical puzzlement very seriously indeedĦBbut he thought that it needed dissolving by analysis rather than solving by the production of theories. The Tractatus presents itself as a key for untying a series of knots both profound and highly technical.
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3. Ethics and Religion
Wittgenstein had a lifelong interest in religion and claimed to see every problem from a religious point of viewĦBbut never committed himself to any formal religion. His various remarks on ethics also suggest a particular point of viewĦBand Wittgenstein often spoke of ethics and religion together. This point of view or attitude can be seen in the four main themes that run through Wittgenstein's writings on ethics and religion: goodnessĦBvalue or meaning are not to be found in the world; living the right way involves acceptance of or agreement with the worldĦBor lifeĦBor God's willĦBor fate; one who lives this way will see the world as a miracle; there is no answer to the problem of life--the solution is the disappearance of the problem.
Certainly Wittgenstein worried about being morally good or even perfectĦBand he had great respect for sincere religious convictionĦBbut he also saidĦBin his 1929 lecture on ethicsĦBthat "the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language," i.e. to talk or write nonsense. This gives support to the view that Wittgenstein believed in mystical truths that somehow cannot be expressed meaningfully but that are of the utmost importance. It is hard to conceiveĦBthoughĦBwhat these 'truths' might be.
An alternative view is that Wittgenstein believed that there is really nothing to say about ethics. This would explain why he wrote less and less about ethics as his life wore on. His "accept and endure" attitude and belief in going "the bloody hard way" are evident in all his workĦBespecially after the Tractatus. Wittgenstein wants his reader not to think (too much) but to look at the "language games" (any practices that involve language) that give rise to philosophical (personalĦBexistentialĦBspiritual) problems. His approach to such problems is painstakingĦBthoroughĦBopen-eyed and receptive. His ethical attitude is an integral part of his method and shows itself as such.
But there is little to say about such an attitude short of recommending it. In Culture and Value p.29e Wittgenstein writes:
Rules of life are dressed up in pictures. And these pictures can only serve to describe what we are to doĦBnot justify it. Because they could provide a justification only if they held good in other respects as well. I can say: "Thank these bees for their honey as though they were kind people who have prepared it for you"; that is intelligible and describes how I should like you to conduct yourself. But I cannot say: "Thank them becauseĦBlookĦBhow kind they are!"--since the next moment they may sting you.
In a world of contingency one cannot prove that a particular attitude is the correct one to take. If this suggests relativismĦBit should be remembered that it too is just one more attitude or point of viewĦBand one without the rich tradition and accumulated wisdomĦBphilosophical reasoning and personal experience ofĦBsayĦBorthodox Christianity or Judaism. Indeed crude relativismĦBthe universal judgement that one cannot make universal judgementsĦBis self- contradictory. Whether Wittgenstein's views suggest a more sophisticated form of relativism is another matterĦBbut the spirit of relativism seems far from Wittgenstein's conservatism and absolute intolerance of his own moral shortcomings. Compare the tolerance that motivates relativism with Wittgenstein's assertion to Russell that he would prefer "by far" an organization dedicated to war and slavery to one dedicated to peace and freedom. (This assertionĦBhoweverĦBshould not be taken literally: Wittgenstein was no war-monger and even recommended letting oneself be massacred rather than taking part in hand-to-hand combat. It was apparently the complacencyĦBand perhaps the self-righteousnessĦBof Russell's liberal cause that Wittgenstein objected to.)
With regard to religionĦBWittgenstein is often considered a kind of Anti-Realist (see below for more on this). He opposed interpretations of religion that emphasize doctrine or philosophical arguments intended to prove God's existenceĦBbut was greatly drawn to religious rituals and symbolsĦBand considered becoming a priest. He likened the ritual of religion to a great gestureĦBas when one kisses a photograph. This is not based on the false belief that the person in the photograph will feel the kiss or return itĦBnor is it based on any other belief. Neither is the kiss just a substitute for a particular phraseĦBlike "I love you." Like the kissĦBreligious activity does express an attitudeĦBbut it is not just the expression of an attitude in the sense that several other forms of expression might do just as well. There might be no substitute that would do. The same might be said of the whole language-game (or games) of religionĦBbut this is a controversial point. If religious utterancesĦBsuch as "God exists," are treated as gestures of a certain kind then this seems not to be treating them as literal statements. Many religious believersĦBincluding Wittgensteinian onesĦBwould object strongly to this. There is roomĦBthoughĦBfor a good deal of sophisticated disagreement about what it means to take a statement literally. For instanceĦBCharles Taylor's viewĦBroughlyĦBis that the real is whatever will not go away. If we cannot reduce talk about God to anything elseĦBor replace itĦBor prove it falseĦBthen perhaps God is as real as anything else.
4. Conception of Philosophy
Wittgenstein's view of what philosophy isĦBor should beĦBchanged little over his life. In the Tractatus he says at 4.111 that "philosophy is not one of the natural sciences," and at 4.112 "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts." Philosophy is not descriptive but elucidatory. Its aim is to clear up muddle and confusion. It follows that philosophers should not concern themselves so much with what is actualĦBkeeping up with the latest popularizations of scienceĦBsayĦBwhich Wittgenstein despised. The philosopher's proper concern is with what is possibleĦBor rather with what is conceivable. This depends on our concepts and the ways they fit together as seen in language. What is conceivable and what is notĦBwhat makes sense and what does notĦBdepends on the rules of languageĦBof grammar.
In Philosophical Investigations Sect. 90 Wittgenstein says:
Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of wordsĦBcausedĦBamong other thingsĦBby certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.
The similarities between the sentences "I'll keep it in mind" and "I'll keep it in this box," for instanceĦB(along with many others) can lead one to think of the mind as a thing something like a box with contents of its own. The nature of this box and its mental contents can then seem very mysterious. Wittgenstein suggests that one wayĦBat leastĦBto deal with such mysteries is to recall the different things one says about mindsĦBmemoriesĦBthoughts and so onĦBin a variety of contexts.
What one saysĦBor what people in general sayĦBcan change. Ways of life and uses of language changeĦBso meanings changeĦBbut not utterly and instantaneously. Things shift and evolveĦBbut rarely if ever so drastically that we lose all grip on meaning. So there is no timeless essence of at least some and perhaps all conceptsĦBbut we still understand one another well enough most of the time.
When nonsense is spoken or writtenĦBor when something just seems fishyĦBwe can sniff it out. The road out of confusion can be a long and difficult oneĦBhence the need for constant attention to detail and particular examples rather than generalizationsĦBwhich tend to be vague and therefore potentially misleading. The slower the routeĦBthe surer the safety at the end of it. That is why Wittgenstein said that in philosophy the winner is the one who finishes last. But we cannot escape language or the confusions to which it gives riseĦBexcept by dying. In the meantimeĦBWittgenstein offers four main methods to avoid philosophical confusionĦBas described by Norman Malcolm: describing circumstances in which a seemingly problematic expression might actually be used in everyday lifeĦBcomparing our use of words with imaginary language gamesĦBimagining fictitious natural historyĦBand explaining psychologically the temptation to use a certain expression inappropriately.
The complexĦBintertwined relationship between a language and the form of life that goes with it means that problems arising from language cannot just be set aside--they infect our livesĦBmaking us live in confusion. We might find our way back to the right pathĦBbut there is no guarantee that we will never again stray. In this sense there can be no progress in philosophy.
In 1931 Wittgenstein described his task thus:
Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of easily accessible wrong turnings. And so we watch one man after another walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he will branch offĦBwhere walk straight on without noticing the side turningĦBetc. etc. What I have to do then is erect signposts at all the junctions where there are wrong turnings so as to help people past the danger points.
But such signposts are all that philosophy can offer and there is no certainty that they will be noticed or followed correctly. And we should remember that a signpost belongs in the context of a particular problem area. It might be no help at all elsewhereĦBand should not be treated as dogma. So philosophy offers no truthsĦBno theoriesĦBnothing excitingĦBbut mainly reminders of what we all know. This is not a glamorous roleĦBbut it is difficult and important. It requires an almost infinite capacity for taking pains (which is one definition of genius) and could have enormous implications for anyone who is drawn to philosophical contemplation or who is misled by bad philosophical theories. This applies not only to professional philosophers but to any people who stray into philosophical confusionĦBperhaps not even realizing that their problems are philosophical and notĦBsayĦBscientific.
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5. Meaning
Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says that: "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."
It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is not offering the general theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted as doing. The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that the meaning of a word is some object that it names--in which case the meaning of a word could be destroyedĦBstolen or locked awayĦBwhich is nonsense--and that the meaning of a word is some psychological feeling--in which case each user of a word could mean something different by itĦBhaving a different feelingĦBand communication would be difficult if not impossible.
Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many things: to what objects the word refers (if any)ĦBwhether it is slang or notĦBwhat part of speech it isĦBwhether it carries overtonesĦBand if so what kind they areĦBand so on. To know all thisĦBor to know enough to get byĦBis to know the use. And generally knowing the use means knowing the meaning. Philosophical questions about consciousnessĦBfor exampleĦBthenĦBshould be responded to by looking at the various uses we make of the word "consciousness." Scientific investigations into the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although they might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led us to change our use of such words). The meaning of any word is a matter of what we do with our languageĦBnot something hidden inside anyone's mind or brain. This is not an attack on neuroscience. It is merely distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned with discovering facts).
One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in Philosophical Investigations Sect.561ĦBwhere Wittgenstein says that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as the copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is not its use. That is to sayĦB"is" has not one complex use (including both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one complex meaningĦBbut two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an accident that the same word has these two uses. It is not an accident that we use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on usĦBon how we use it.
This is not completely arbitraryĦBhowever. Depending on one's environmentĦBone's physical needs and desiresĦBone's emotionsĦBone's sensory capacitiesĦBand so onĦBdifferent concepts will be more natural or useful to one. This is why "forms of life" are so important to Wittgenstein. What matters to you depends on how you live (and vice versa)ĦBand this shapes your experience. So if a lion could speakĦBWittgenstein saysĦBwe would not be able to understand it. We might realize that "roar" meant zebraĦBor that "roarĦBroar" meant lame zebraĦBbut we would not understand lion ethicsĦBpoliticsĦBaesthetic tasteĦBreligionĦBhumor and such likeĦBif lions have these things. We could not honestly say "I know what you mean" to a lion. Understanding another involves empathyĦBwhich requires the kind of similarity that we just do not have with lionsĦBand that many people do not have with other human beings.
When a person says something what he or she means depends not only on what is said but also on the context in which it is said. ImportanceĦBpointĦBmeaning are given by the surroundings. WordsĦBgesturesĦBexpressions come aliveĦBas it wereĦBonly within a language gameĦBa cultureĦBa form of life. If a pictureĦBsayĦBmeans something then it means so to somebody. Its meaning is not an objective property of the picture in the way that its size and shape are. The same goes of any mental picture. Hence Wittgenstein's remark that "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of." Any internal image would need interpretation. If I interpret my thought as one of Hitler and God sees it as Charlie ChaplinĦBwho is right? Which of the two famous contemporaries of Wittgenstein's I mean shows itself in the way I behaveĦBthe things I do and say. It is in this that the useĦBthe meaningĦBof my thought or mental picture lies. "The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it."
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6. Rules and Private Language
Without sharing certain attitudes towards the things around usĦBsharing a sense of relevance and responding in similar waysĦBcommunication would be impossible. It is importantĦBfor instanceĦBthat nearly all of us agree nearly all the time on what colors things are. Such agreement is part of our concept of colorĦBWittgenstein suggests. Regularity of the use of such concepts and agreement in their application is part of languageĦBnot a logically necessary precondition of it. We cannot separate the life in which there is such agreement from our concept of color. Imagine a different form or way of life and you imagine a different language with different conceptsĦBdifferent rules and a different logic.
This raises the question of the relation between language and forms or ways of life. For instanceĦBcould just one person have a language of his or her own? To imagine an individual solitary from birth is scarcely to imagine a form of life at allĦBbut more like just imagining a life- form. MoreoverĦBlanguage involves rules establishing certain linguistic practices. Rules of grammar express the fact that it is our practice to say this (e.g. "half past twelve") and not that (e.g. "half to one"). Agreement is essential to such practices. Could a solitary individualĦBthenĦBengage in any practiceĦBincluding linguistic ones? With whom could he or she agree? This is a controversial issue in the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Gordon Baker and P.M.S. Hacker hold that such a solitary man could speak his own languageĦBfollow his own rulesĦBand so onĦBagreeingĦBover timeĦBwith himself in his judgements and behavior. Orthodoxy is against this interpretationĦBhowever.
Norman Malcolm has written that "If you conceive of an individual who has been in solitude his whole life longĦBthen you have cut away the background of instructionĦBcorrectionĦBacceptance--in shortĦBthe circumstances in which a rule is givenĦBenforcedĦBand followed." Mere regularity of behavior does not constitute following rulesĦBwhether they be rules of grammar or any other kind. A car that never starts in cold weather does not follow the rule "Don't start when it's cold," nor does a songbird follow a rule in singing the same song every day. Whether a solitary-from-birth individual would ever do anything that we would properly call following a rule is at least highly doubtful. How could he or she give himself or herself a rule to follow without language? And how could he or she get a language? Inventing one would involve inventing meaningĦBas Rush Rhees has arguedĦBand this sounds incoherent. (The most famous debate about this was between Rhees and A.J. Ayer. Unfortunately for WittgensteinĦBAyer is generally considered to have won.) AlternativelyĦBperhaps the Crusoe-like figure just does behaveĦBsoundĦBetc. just like a native speaker ofĦBsayĦBEnglish. But this is to imagine either a freakish automatonĦBnot a human beingĦBor else a miracle. In the case of a miracleĦBWittgenstein saysĦBit is significant that we imagine not just the pseudo- Crusoe but also God. In the case of the automatic speakerĦBwe might adopt what Daniel Dennett calls an "intentional stance" towards himĦBcalling what he does "speaking English," but he is obviously not doing what the rest of us English-speakers--who learned the languageĦBrather than being born speaking itĦBand who influence and are influenced by others in our use of the language--do.
The debate about solitary individuals is sometimes referred to as the debate about "private language." Wittgenstein uses this expression in another contextĦBhoweverĦBto name a language that refers to private sensations. Such a private language by definition cannot be understood by anyone other than its user (who alone knows the sensations to which it refers). Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a man who decides to write 'S' in his diary whenever he has a certain sensation. This sensation has no natural expressionĦBand 'S' cannot be defined in words. The only judge of whether 'S' is used correctly is the inventor of 'S'. The only criterion of correctness is whether a sensation feels the same to him or her. There are no criteria for its being the same other than its seeming the same. So he writes 'S' when he feels like it. He might as well be doodling. The so-called 'private language' is no language at all. The point of this is not to show that a private language is impossible but to show that certain things one might want to say about language are ultimately incoherent. If we really try to picture a world of private objects (sensations) and inner acts of meaning and so onĦBwe see that what we picture is either regular public language or incomprehensible behavior (the man might as well quack as say or write 'S').
This does notĦBas has been allegedĦBmake Wittgenstein a behaviorist. He does not deny the existence of sensations or experiences. PainsĦBticklesĦBitchesĦBetc. are all part of human lifeĦBof course. At Philosophical Investigations Sect. 293 Wittgenstein says that "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." This suggests not that pains and so on are irrelevant but that we should not construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation'. If we want to understand a concept like pain we should not think of a pain as a private object referred to somehow by the public word "pain." A pain is not "a something," just as loveĦBdemocracy and strength are not thingsĦBbut it is no more "a nothing" than they are either (see Philosophical Investigations Sect. 304). Saying this is hardly satisfactoryĦBbut there is no simple answer to the question "What is pain?" Wittgenstein offers not an answer but a kind of philosophical 'therapy' intended to clear away what can seem so obscure. To judge the value of this therapyĦBthe reader will just have to read Wittgenstein's work for herself.
The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole topic is Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke is struck by the idea that anything might count as continuing a series or following a rule in the same way. It all depends on how the rule or series is interpreted. And any rule for interpretation will itself be subject to a variety of interpretationsĦBand so on. What counts as following a rule correctlyĦBthenĦBis not determined somehow by the rule itself but by what the relevant linguistic community accepts as following the rule. So whether two plus two equals four depends not on some abstractĦBextra-human rule of additionĦBbut on what weĦBand especially the people we appoint as expertsĦBaccept. Truth conditions are replaced by assertability conditions. To put it crudelyĦBwhat counts is not what is true or right (in some sense independent of the community of language users)ĦBbut what you can get away with or get others to accept.
Kripke's theory is clear and ingeniousĦBand owes a lot to WittgensteinĦBbut is doubtful as an interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripke himself presents the argument not as Wittgenstein'sĦBnor as his ownĦBbut as "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein's is suggested by the fact that it is a theoryĦBand Wittgenstein rejected philosophical theoriesĦBand by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the first sentence of Philosophical Investigations Sect. 201: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a ruleĦBbecause every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." For Kripke's theory as a reading of WittgensteinĦBit is not good that the very next paragraph beginsĦB"It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here..." StillĦBit is no easy matter to see just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person often referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The key perhaps lies later in the same paragraphĦBwhere Wittgenstein writes that "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation". Many scholarsĦBnotably Baker and HackerĦBhave gone to great lengths to explain why Kripke is mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understandĦBone of the best ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to study Kripke and his Wittgensteinian critics. At the very leastĦBKripke introduces his readers well to issues that were of great concern to Wittgenstein and shows their importance.
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7. Realism and Anti-Realism
Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and Anti-Realism is an interesting one. His emphasis on language and human behaviorĦBpracticesĦBetc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-Realism in many people's eyes. He has even been accused of linguistic idealismĦBthe idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of physicsĦBsayĦBwould by this theory just be laws of languageĦBthe rules of the language game of physics. Anti-Realist scepticism of this kind has proved quite popular in the philosophy of science and in theologyĦBas well as more generally in metaphysics and ethics.
On the other handĦBthere is a school of Wittgensteinian RealismĦBwhich is less well known. Wittgenstein's views on religionĦBfor instanceĦBare often compared with those of Simone WeilĦBwho was a Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her Realism and Imagination in Ethics and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. HoweverĦBone should not go too far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. LovibondĦBfor instanceĦBequates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement)ĦBso her Realism is of a controversial kind.
Both Realism and Anti-RealismĦBthoughĦBare theoriesĦBor schools of theoriesĦBand Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of theories in philosophy. This does not prove that he practiced what he preachedĦBbut it should give us pause. It is also worth noting that supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist nor an Anti-RealistĦBat least with regard to metaphysics. There is something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found to 'agree' with it. The Anti-Realist says that we could not get outside our thought or language (or form of life or language games) to compare the two. But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we can or cannot doĦBbut with what makes sense. If metaphysical Realism is incoherent then so is its opposite. The nonsensical utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by sayingĦB"NoĦBit is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherentĦBas Wittgenstein would sayĦBthen so is Anti-Realism.
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8. Certainty
Wittgenstein's last writings were on the subject of certainty. He wrote in response to G.E. Moore's attack on scepticism about the external world. Moore had held up one handĦBsaid "Here is one hand," then held up his other hand and said "and here is another." His point was that things outside the mind really do existĦBwe know they doĦBand that no grounds for scepticism could be strong enough to undermine this commonsense knowledge.
Wittgenstein did not defend scepticismĦBbut questioned Moore's claim to know that he had two hands. Such 'knowledge' is not something that one is ever taughtĦBor finds outĦBor proves. It is more like a background against which we come to know other things. Wittgenstein compares this background to the bed of a river. This river bed provides the supportĦBthe contextĦBin which claims to know various things have meaning. The bed itself is not something we can know or doubt. In normal circumstances no sane person doubts how many hands he or she has. But unusual circumstances can occur and what was part of the river bed can shift and become part of the river. I mightĦBfor instanceĦBwake up dazed after a terrible accident and wonder whether my handsĦBwhich I cannot feelĦBare still there or not. This is quite differentĦBthoughĦBfrom Descartes's pretended doubt as to whether he has a body at all. Such radical doubt is really not doubt at allĦBfrom Wittgenstein's point of view. And so it cannot be dispelled by a proof that the body existsĦBas Moore tried to do.
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9. Continuity
Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory of language and mysticismĦBaccording to this view. Then there came a transitional middle period when he first returned to philosophical work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems of philosophy. This period led to his matureĦBlater period which gave us the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's workĦBbut the differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the Tractatus is concerned with the general form of the propositionĦBthe general nature of metaphysicsĦBand so onĦBin his later work Wittgenstein is very critical of "the craving for generality"; andĦBin the Tractatus Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophyĦBwhereas the later work treats no problems as central. Another obvious difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a carefully constructed set of short propositions. The InvestigationsĦBthough also consisting of numbered sectionsĦBis longerĦBless clearly organized and more ramblingĦBat least in appearance. This reflects Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few central problems in philosophyĦBand his insistence on paying attention to particular casesĦBgoing over the rough ground.
On the other handĦBthe Tractatus itself says that its propositions are nonsense and thusĦBin a sense (not easy to understand)ĦBrejects itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the Tractatus is notĦBthereforeĦBproof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are investigated one at a timeĦBalthough many overlap. There is not a full-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy. OtherwiseĦBthe Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.
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10. Wittgenstein in History
Wittgenstein's place in the history of philosophy is a peculiar one. His philosophical education was unconventional (going from engineering to working first-hand with one of the greatest philosophers of his day in Bertrand Russell) and he seems never to have felt the need to go back and make a thorough study of the history of philosophy. He was interested in PlatoĦBadmired LeibnizĦBbut was most influenced by the work of SchopenhauerĦBRussell and Frege.
From Schopenhauer (perhaps) Wittgenstein got his interest in solipsism and in the ethical nature of the relation between the will and the world. Schopenhauer's saying that "The world is my idea," (from The World as Will and Idea) is echoed in such remarks as "The world is my world" (from Tractatus 5.62). What Wittgenstein means hereĦBwhere he also says that what the solipsist means is quite correctĦBbut that it cannot be saidĦBis obscure and controversial. Some have taken him to mean that solipsism is true but for some reason cannot be expressed. H.O. MounceĦBin his valuable Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An IntroductionĦBsays that this interpretation is surely wrong. Mounce's view is that Wittgenstein holds solipsism itself to be a confusionĦBbut one that sometimes arises when one tries to express the fact that "I have a point of view on the world which is without neighbours." (Mounce p.91) Wittgenstein was not a solipsist but he remained interested in solipsism and related problems of scepticism throughout his life.
Frege was a mathematician as well as a logician. He was interested in questions of truth and falsehoodĦBsense and reference (a distinction he made famous) and in the relation between objects and conceptsĦBpropositions and thoughts. But his interest was in logic and mathematics exclusivelyĦBnot in psychology or ethics. His great contribution to logic was to introduce various mathematical elements into formal logicĦBincluding quantificationĦBfunctionsĦBarguments (in the mathematical sense of something substituted for a variable in a function) and the value of a function. In logic this valueĦBaccording to FregeĦBis always either the True or the FalseĦBhence the notion of truth-value. Both Frege and Russell wanted to show that mathematics is an extension of logic. Undoubtedly both men influenced Wittgenstein enormouslyĦBespecially since he worked first-hand with Russell. Some measure of their importance to him can be seen in the preface to the TractatusĦBwhere Wittgenstein says that he is "indebted to Frege's great works and to the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts." For some insight into whether Frege or Russell had the greater influence one can consider whether one would rather be recognized for his or her great works or for simply being a friend.
In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy enormously. The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly impressed by what they found in the TractatusĦBespecially the idea that logic and mathematics are analyticĦBthe verifiability principle and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at clarificationĦBnot the discovery of facts. WittgensteinĦBthoughĦBsaid that it was what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.
The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought. These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later work and its attention to grammar.
Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and history of analytic philosophyĦBbut he has become rather unfashionable because of his anti-theoreticalĦBanti- scientism stanceĦBbecause of the difficulty of his workĦBand perhaps also because he has been little understood. Similarities between Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating interest among continental philosophersĦBand Wittgenstein may yet prove to be a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of philosophy.
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11. Annotated Bibliography
A full bibliographical guide to works by and on Wittgenstein would fill a whole bookĦBnamely Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide by Guido Frongia and Brian McGuinness (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1990). Obviously this is already out of date. Instead of a complete guideĦBthereforeĦBwhat follows is a list of some of Wittgenstein's main worksĦBsome of the best secondary material on his workĦBand a few other works chosen for their accessibility and entertainment valueĦBfor want of a better expression.
Wittgenstein's main works are these:
ĦE Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusĦBtranslated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan PaulĦBLondon 1961). His early classic.
ĦE The Blue and Brown BooksĦB(Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1969). From his middle periodĦBthese are preliminary studies for his later work.
ĦE Philosophical InvestigationsĦBtranslated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1963). His late classic.
ĦE On CertaintyĦBedited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von WrightĦBtranslated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1979). Like many of Wittgenstein's worksĦBthis was compiled after his death from notes he had made. In this case the notes come from the last year and a half of his life.
Works of more general interest by Wittgenstein include these:
ĦE Culture and ValueĦBtranslated by Peter Winch (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1980). These are notes from throughout Wittgenstein's life dealing with all kinds of topics hinted at by its titleĦBincluding musicĦBliteratureĦBphilosophyĦBreligion and the value of silliness.
ĦE Lectures and Conversations on AestheticsĦBPsychology and Religious BeliefĦBedited by Cyril Barrett (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1966). For 'psychology' read 'Freud'ĦBotherwise the title is explanation enough. Hilary Putnam has recommended the section on religion as a valuable introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole. The best biographies of Wittgenstein are:
ĦE Ray Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Jonathan CapeĦBLondon 1990)ĦBwhich is full of enlightening detail.
ĦE Norman Malcolm Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford University PressĦBOxford and New York 1984)ĦBwhich is much shorter and includes material from G.H. von Wright as well. Two of the best books on the Tractatus are:
ĦE G.E.M. Anscombe An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (University of Pennsylvania PressĦBPhiladelphia 1971)ĦBwhich emphasizes the importance of Frege and is notoriously difficult
ĦE H.O. Mounce Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1981)ĦBwhich is lighter but more reader-friendly.
A good rule of thumb for picking secondary material on Wittgenstein is to trust Wittgenstein's own judgement. He chose G.E.M. AnscombeĦBRush Rhees and G.H. von Wright to understand and deal with his unpublished writings after his death. Anything by one of these people should be fairly reliable. More contentiouslyĦBI would say that the best people writing on Wittgenstein today are James Conant and Cora Diamond. Other books referred to in the text above or of special note are these:
ĦE O.K. Bouwsma Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949-1951ĦBedited by J.L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit (HackettĦBIndianapolis 1986). A seemingly little read slim volume that includes records of Wittgenstein's comments on such diverse and interesting topics as DescartesĦButilitarianism and the word 'cheeseburger'.
ĦE Stanley Cavell The Claim of Reason: WittgensteinĦBSkepticismĦBMoralityĦBand Tragedy (Oxford University PressĦBOxford and New York 1979). A longĦBrichĦBchallenging classic.
ĦE Cora Diamond The Realistic Spirit: WittgensteinĦBPhilosophyĦBand the Mind (MITĦBCambridgeĦBMassachusetts 1991). A collection of essays of varying degrees of accessibility on FregeĦBWittgenstein and ethicsĦBunited by their Wittgensteinian spirit.
ĦE M.O'C. Drury The Danger of Words (Thoemmes PressĦBBristolĦBU.K. and WashingtonĦBD.C. 1996). A classicĦBincluding discussions of issues in psychiatry and religion by a friend of Wittgenstein's.
ĦE Paul Engelmann Letters from Wittgenstein with a memoir (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1967). Includes discussions by Wittgenstein and his friend Engelmann on the TractatusĦBreligionĦBliterature and culture.
ĦE Saul A. Kripke Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University PressĦBCambridgeĦBMassachusetts 1982). See the section on rules and private language above.
ĦE Norman Malcolm Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden (Basil BlackwellĦBOxford 1986). One of the best accounts of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the disreputable point of view that the Tractatus advanced theses which are then attacked in the later work.
ĦE Norman Malcolm Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?ĦBedited with a response by Peter Winch (Cornell University PressĦBIthacaĦBNew York 1994). Malcolm basically summarizes Wittgenstein's philosophyĦBas he understands itĦBwith a special emphasis on religion. Winch then respondsĦBcorrecting Malcolm's account where necessary. The result is a highly accessible composite overview of Wittgenstein's work from the religious point of viewĦBwhich is how Wittgenstein himself said that he saw every problem.
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Author Information:
Duncan J. Richter
Email: RICHTERDJ@vmi.edu
Virginia Military Institute
c 2006